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The notion of a tradeoff between risk and incentives is a key implication of the 
principal-agent model that has received significant attention in the literature since the 
original papers by Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979).  The intuition is that risk-
averse workers are reluctant to accept output-contingent compensation contracts in 
production settings characterized by a high degree of risk, meaning situations in which 
output is determined largely by stochastic factors beyond the worker’s control.  The 
firm’s response, therefore, is to decrease the amount of output-based pay as the degree of 
risk or uncertainty in the production environment increases.  This theoretical prediction 
has been the subject of a vast number of empirical tests, and the collective evidence has 
been inconclusive.  Some tests have found the predicted negative relationship, while 
others have found a positive relationship or no relationship. 
Prendergast (2002) proposes a theory that potentially explains the inconclusive 
empirical evidence.  At the heart of Prendergast’s explanation is the delegation of worker 
authority which, he argues, is a key element that the standard agency model ignores.  In 
production settings characterized by a low level of uncertainty, the firm has a clear sense 
of what tasks should be performed and how they should be performed.  In such settings, 
the firm is content to monitor labor inputs.  In contrast, when the production setting is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty, the firm understands less what decisions 
need to be made and which tasks should be performed.  The firm responds by delegating 
more authority to the worker, who is closer to the production process and often has better 
information than does the firm about what tasks should be performed.1  The firm 
                                                 
1 The argument that the agent should receive more authority the greater is his informational advantage was 
formalized by Aoki (1986).  See also Dessein (2002) for a discussion of recent trends in firms pushing 
decision rights lower in their organizational hierarchies in order to profit from the local knowledge 
possessed by lower level managers.   
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accompanies this delegation of authority with output-based pay, to hold the worker 
accountable for his decisions and to ensure that the worker does not misuse his discretion 
by choosing the wrong tasks.2  That is, when the degree of uncertainty increases, the firm 
shifts from monitoring inputs and retaining control over tasks to monitoring outputs and 
delegating authority over tasks.   
This suggests a positive relationship between incentive pay and risk (operating 
through the channel of worker authority), in contrast to the negative relationship 
(operating through the channel of insurance) implied by standard agency theory.  Thus, 
the main testable result of Prendergast’s model is that the predicted sign of the 
relationship between risk and incentives is ambiguous.  He states the empirical problem 
as follows:   
“The empirical difficulty here is that worker discretion is typically unobserved that could 
bias econometric estimates … without controlling for some measure of responsibility, we 
are likely to find a positive relationship between uncertainty and incentives; but if we can 
control for task assignment, we would expect to see no such relationship.”  (pp. 1096-
1097) 
 
Thus, Prendergast argues that controlling for worker authority in a regression of incentive 
pay on risk should decrease the coefficient on risk.   
 Prendergast cites several empirical papers that provide indirect support for his 
theory, but a direct test requires that worker authority be incorporated into the standard 
risk-incentives regressions.  A practical difficulty with implementing this test is that 
measures of worker authority over task selection are rarely available in existing data sets.  
                                                 
2 The argument that authority and incentives go hand in hand was formalized in the literature prior to 
Prendergast (2002).  Jensen and Meckling (1992) analyzed how the decentralization of decision rights to 
agents with specific knowledge and abilities increases efficiency and argued that these decision rights 
should be accompanied by a control mechanism such as pay-for-performance in order to motivate 
individuals to use their decision rights optimally.  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) derived a formal model 
in which the effectiveness of incentives is enhanced when simultaneously implemented with delegation of 
responsibility to agents. 
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Furthermore, measures of worker authority must be available in conjunction with 
measures of incentive pay and risk for the theory to be tested.  Our empirical tests are 
based on a large, nationally-representative cross section of British establishments from 
the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), containing information on 
risk, multiple dimensions of worker authority (both as perceived by workers and as 
perceived by employers), and incentive pay.   
A potential concern is that a control for worker authority appearing on the right-
hand side of a risk-incentives model might be endogenous; since it is chosen by the 
employer along with the structure of the compensation plan, the unobserved determinants 
of both choices are likely to be correlated, biasing the coefficients.  To address this 
concern we estimate a bivariate probit model, treating both incentive pay and worker 
authority as endogenous variables.  The parameters in the bivariate probit model with a 
dummy endogenous variable on the right-hand side are identified (except in pathological 
cases, such as one demonstrated in Maddala 1983, that do not apply here) even in the 
absence of exclusion restrictions (Heckman 1978, Wilde 2000, Monfardini and Radice 
2008).  An exogeneity test in this model reveals that the null hypothesis that worker 
authority is exogenous cannot be rejected.   
 We address four empirical questions in this paper.  Is there empirical support for:  
1) the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 
2) a positive relationship between authority and incentives? 
3) a positive relationship between risk and authority? 
4) the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model, namely that the risk 
coefficient in an incentives regression should become smaller (i.e. less positive or 
 
4 
 
 
 
more negative) when delegation of worker authority is incorporated into the risk-
incentives regression model?   
Our empirical results support affirmative answers to all four questions, though in some 
cases the relevant parameters are estimated with low precision.  Thus, our analysis 
contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence clarifying the relationship 
between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the 
delegation of worker decision rights to cope with risk.  In particular, we attempt to 
reconcile the mixed nature of the empirical literature concerning evidence for a risk-
incentives tradeoff by empirically addressing Prendergast’s extension of the standard 
principal-agent model.   
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
A large number of empirical studies have aimed to test for the negative 
relationship between risk and incentives predicted by standard agency theory using data 
from a variety of industries and worker types.  Some tests have found the predicted 
negative relationship (Lambert and Larcker 1987, Kawasaki and McMillan 1987, 
Aggarwal and Samwick 1999 and 2002, Mengistae and Xu 2004, Adams 2005, Gibbs, 
Merchant, Van der Stede and Vargus 2006, and Wulf 2007), while others have found a 
positive relationship (Rao 1971, Norton 1988, Leffler and Rucker 1991, Allen and Lueck 
1992, Lafontaine 1992, Martin 1988, Core and Guay 1999 and 2002, Conyon and 
Murphy 2000, Ackerberg and Botticini 2002, Oyer and Schaefer 2005, Foss and Laursen 
2005, Shi 2005) or no statistically significant relationship at all (Anderson and 
Schmittlein 1984, John and Weitz 1989, Yermack 1995, Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith 
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1996, Ittner, Larcker and Rajan 1997, Garen 1994, Nagar 2002).3  The majority of these 
studies did not include a control for authority in the regressions of incentives on risk. 
Turning to our second empirical question, previous empirical evidence tends to 
support the notion that incentive pay accompanies the delegation of authority (MacLeod 
and Parent 1999, Nagar 2002, Colombo and Delmastro 2004, Foss and Laursen 2005, 
Wulf 2007).  Regarding our third empirical question, direct empirical evidence regarding 
a positive correlation between delegation and risk is rare since data spanning multiple 
firms and industries typically do not contain information on the extent of authority 
delegated to workers.  Nonetheless, some empirical support can be found from 
franchises, sharecropped farms, retail banking, and Danish firms (Lafontaine 1992, Rao 
1971, Nagar 2002, Foss and Laursen 2005). 
While the evidence on these first three questions from the broad nationally-
representative sample of British establishments we study in this paper complements the 
evidence from previous analyses, in our view the main contribution of our study is the 
evidence we present on the fourth empirical question.  Our data are particularly well 
suited for testing Prendergast’s model, given the availability of an authority measure that 
closely matches the notion of authority discussed by Prendergast.  Several previous 
studies have incorporated authority into a risk-incentives regression model, and these are 
most closely related to our paper as we now discuss.    
Foss and Laursen (2005) studied 993 Danish firms sampled in 1996.  While their 
measures of incentive pay and authority are roughly similar to ours, their main risk 
measure, which they refer to as “within-industry variance in profitability”, differs 
                                                 
3 A table that summarizes the variables, data and econometric models used in these papers is available from 
the authors upon request. 
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substantially.  To construct this variable, they assigned each firm in their sample to one of 
70 industry categories.  Within each of these 70 groups, they computed the variance of 
firm profits.  Each firm’s value for the risk measure is the variance that was computed for 
all firms belonging to the same industry category, so that the risk variable in their 
analysis assumes only 70 possible values.  They then estimated an ordered probit model 
using incentive pay as the dependent variable and the 70-valued risk measure as an 
independent variable, along with a set of controls. 
Estimating the Foss and Laursen model using their risk measure is 
computationally identical to estimating a more general model that includes 70 industry 
dummies (in lieu of their risk measure) but that also imposes 70 parametric restrictions, 
so that the ratio of every pair of coefficients on the industry dummies is constrained to 
equal a constant that the researcher specifies.  The 70 restrictions implicitly imposed in 
the Foss and Laursen model are testable but are not tested in their paper.  Implicit in these 
70 restrictions is the strong assumption that the coefficients of each industry dummy 
reflect the effect of risk and nothing else.  Since that assumption is unlikely to be correct, 
there is reason to suspect that the test might fail.  Our risk measure, which we describe 
shortly, does not impose such restrictions on industry dummies.   
Adams (2005) analyzed the manufacturing establishments from the 1998 WERS 
(a subsample of 166 establishments of the 1590 we consider).  Adams treated the unit of 
observation as the worker rather than the establishment, but incentive pay is not observed 
in the 1998 WERS at the level of individual workers, so he attempted to infer the 
measure using establishment-level questions about what fraction of the workers in the 
given worker’s occupation receives either profit-related pay or ESOPs (if more than 80% 
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of the workers receive such payments, the given worker is assumed to receive it, if less 
than 20% of the workers receive such payments, the given worker is assumed not to 
receive it, and if between 20% and 80% of the workers receive such payments, the given 
worker is dropped from the sample).  We prefer to conduct the analysis at the 
establishment level because the risk measure available in the WERS only varies across 
establishments and not across workers within an establishment.  So for the purpose of 
measuring the risk-incentives tradeoff, no additional information comes from 
disaggregating to the worker level, since this parameter is identified only by variation 
across establishments.   
Wulf (2007) used a panel of 250 publicly-traded U.S. firms to show that in the 
presence of a control for whether division managers have officer status (such as 
president, CFO, VP) the tradeoff between division-level risk and managerial incentives is 
stronger than when the control is omitted.  This result is consistent with the notion of 
authority as a mitigating factor in the risk-incentives relationship.  However, one aspect 
of the analysis that complicates an interpretation of this as a direct test of Prendergast’s 
main implication is that the set of covariates in the regressions which omit authority are 
different from those that include authority.  
Nagar (2002) used a cross section of 100 retail banks in the U.S. in 1994 to show 
that, holding constant the authority delegated from top bank management to branch 
managers (in terms of hiring, promotions, hours and investment decisions), there is a 
negative but statistically insignificant relationship between uncertainty (as proxied by 
volatility in earnings and bank growth) and incentive pay (as reflected by the proportion 
of bank managers’ pay comprised of bonuses).  Since that study did not estimate models 
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that omit authority, we are unable to make a comparison of the relationship between risk 
and incentives when authority is controlled as opposed to when it is not, so the study does 
not provide a test of our fourth empirical question.   
Shi (2005) used data on 2900 CEO’s from the Compustat Execucomp database in 
1992-2001, providing evidence consistent with Prendergast’s main testable prediction if 
we interpret Shi’s notion of CEO ability to respond to risk broadly as Prendergast’s 
notion of decision-making authority.  Specifically, Shi found that CEO incentives, as 
measured by the share of firm profits held by the CEO, increase with industry-wide risk 
measured as variance of industry stock return, which Shi argued is risk to which the CEO 
can respond by collecting industry information and making decisions based on it, and this 
positive relation diminishes as the definition of industry is broadened, so that the CEO is 
less able to act on collected information.  An advantage of our analysis is that while Shi 
focuses only on CEOs, our study is based on a broad sample of employee-types, both 
managerial and non-managerial. 
Finally, Ben-Ner, Kong, and Lluis (2007) analyzed 640 observations from the 
Minnesota Human Resources Management Practices, a survey in 1994-1995 of private, 
for-profit, Minnesota-based firms.  Their binary incentives measure indicates the 
“existence of an individual incentives plan”, and they used an authority measure similar 
to ours.  Their analysis considered two measures of risk or uncertainty, namely “external 
uncertainty” and “internal uncertainty”.  The external uncertainty measure is similar to 
that constructed by Foss and Laursen (2005), as described earlier.  The internal 
uncertainty measure is the sum of 3 components that the authors argue should be related 
to internal uncertainty (i.e. complexity, variability, and routine, each of which is 
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measured on a Likert scale).  Some of the evidence in Ben-Ner, Kong, and Lluis is 
consistent with ours (e.g. positive relationships between incentives and delegation and 
between delegation and risk).  However, as was the case with Wulf (2007), one aspect of 
their analysis that complicates an interpretation of the results as a direct test of 
Prendergast’s main implication is that the specifications in the regressions that omit 
authority are different from those that include authority. 
While Prendergast’s model is one of the earliest and probably the best known in 
the theoretical literature aiming to reconcile agency theory with the mixed empirical 
support for a risk-incentives tradeoff, alternative theoretical approaches for explaining the 
empirical puzzle have been proposed (e.g., Zabojnik 1996, Core and Qian 2002, Baker 
and Jorgensen 2003, Raith 2003, Oyer 2004, Adams 2005, Raith 2005, Serfes 2005, Shi 
2005).  Many of these alternative theories do not concern issues of delegation of 
authority, and some of them are based on ideas that our data are ill-equipped to address 
(e.g. distinguishing between two alternative types of risk, as in Zabojnik 1996 and Baker 
and Jorgensen 2003), so we do not address them in this paper.  However, the empirical 
support for Prendergast’s model that we find in this paper does not cast doubt on the 
validity of these alternative theories.      
 
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES 
In Prendergast’s model, the risk-neutral agent exerts effort on one of n tasks.  The 
principal chooses either an input-based or an output-based compensation contract, and 
either assigns the agent a task or delegates authority to the agent to choose a task.  Thus, 
in a literal interpretation of the model the worker who has been delegated authority 
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chooses what task to perform.  In real-world organizations, it is often the upper-level 
managers who have the authority to choose the tasks, while front line workers are granted 
authority not over what tasks to perform but rather over how and when to perform them; 
i.e. the actual tasks – what is supposed to be done – are determined higher up in the 
organization.  We argue that a broader interpretation of the term “task delegation” 
(extending to how and when) in Prendergast’s model is appropriate, and in that case his 
model is also applicable to non-managerial workers.  For example, a worker doing a job 
consisting of multiple tasks can choose the emphasis to place on each, so Prendergast’s 
assumption that a worker chooses one out of n tasks could be interpreted to mean the 
emphasis the worker places on a particular task or the frequency with which it is 
performed.    
As in earlier work (e.g. Holmstrom 1979, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) 
Prendergast interprets risk as uncertainty in the economic environment.  The firm’s 
output is yi = ei + εi, where i denotes the agent’s task, and ei is the agent’s effort.  The n 
random variables, εi, have common variance, σ2, but differ in their means, with an 
increase in σ2 implying a more uncertain production environment.   
The agent knows the true value of εi whereas the principal only knows its 
distribution, and this asymmetry justifies the delegation of authority, given that the 
worker frequently has more accurate information than does the manager about the 
idiosyncrasies of the production process by virtue of being closer to it.  For example, a 
sales clerk would be better informed concerning customers’ impressions about a new 
product (i.e., demand variability) than would be the store manager.  Likewise, a line 
worker is more likely to know whether the particular machine he operates is about to 
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break down and lead to a production bottleneck (i.e., supply variability) than the plant 
manager.   
When σ2 is sufficiently low the principal assigns the agent a task and compensates 
using an input-based contract, whereas when σ2 is sufficiently high the principal allows 
the agent to choose the task but compensates using an output-based contract.  If agents 
are risk-averse, the standard risk-incentives tradeoff is also present, and the net effect of 
risk on incentives is ambiguous in sign.  From this discussion, four points emerge that 
can be addressed empirically: 
1. In the absence of a control for delegation of worker authority, the sign of the risk-
incentive relationship is theoretically ambiguous. 
2. Incentive pay and delegation of worker authority should be positively correlated. 
3. Authority and risk should be positively correlated. 
4. When a control for worker authority is included in a regression of incentive pay on 
risk, the risk coefficient should decrease (i.e. become less positive or more negative). 
 
IV. METHODS 
Data 
Our sample is drawn from both the management and worker questionnaires in the 
1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), jointly sponsored by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and Social Research Council, 
and the Policy Studies Institute.  Distributed via the UK Data Archive, the WERS data 
are a nationally representative stratified random sample covering British workplaces with 
at least ten employees, except for those in the following 1992 Standard Industrial 
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Classification (SIC) divisions: agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining and 
quarrying; private households with employed persons; and extra-territorial organizations.  
Some of the 3192 workplaces targeted were found to be out of scope, and the final 
sample size of 2191 implies a net response rate of 80.4% (Cully et al., 1999) after 
excluding the out-of-scope cases.4  Data were collected between October 1997 and June 
1998 via face-to-face interviews.  The respondent in the management questionnaire was 
usually the most senior manager at the workplace with responsibility for employment 
relations.  In addition, a random sample of up to 25 employees per establishment was 
surveyed, producing the responses for the employee questionnaire.   
The “risk” question was only asked of establishments in the private sector, 
producing 1591 responses.  Of these, 1590 establishments responded to the questions 
about performance-related pay.  Descriptive statistics for all variables in our analysis are 
displayed in Table 1 for the analysis sample of 1590 establishments.  In Table 1 and in all 
of our analysis we use establishment weights; in most cases worker weights yield the 
same qualitative results.  Some of the variables in our analysis contain missing values, 
and we estimate all of our models using list-wise deletion.  The main source of missing 
information is the measure of worker authority, since only 1277 of the 1590 
establishments reported any worker responses to the authority question.  A table of means 
on this smaller subsample of N = 1277 closely matches Table 1. 
 
   
                                                 
4 The “scope” is workplaces with 10 or more employees located in Great Britain (England, Scotland and 
Wales) and engaged in activities within Sections D (Manufacturing) to O (Other Community, Social and 
Personal Services) of the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification.  The survey covers both private and 
public sectors.  If a case is sampled that does not meet these parameters, it is called “out of scope.” 
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Measures 
Incentive Pay  
 In the principal-agent model, the firm consists of a single worker whose 
individual output (or net revenue) coincides with that of the firm.  Taken literally, the 
model abstracts from some relevant details of the workplace, such as the fact that most 
firms are comprised of more than one worker, and a broader interpretation is therefore 
required if the theory is to be helpful in understanding behavior in a large sample of 
employers.  In practice, employers rarely design incentive compensation systems tailored 
to the characteristics of individual workers.  In the typical workplace, the employer 
designs the incentive pay system to apply to broad groups of workers (such as all workers 
within an establishment or perhaps all workers in a particular occupation within the 
establishment) rather than an individual worker.  Thus, from the standpoint of empirical 
work that aims to test the theory, a measure of pay-for-performance at the level of the 
establishment (as opposed to the level of the individual worker) is acceptable.  We use 
the following measure from the management survey: 
Performance Pay = 1 if any employees at the workplace receive payments or dividends 
                                   from individual or group performance-related schemes 
       = 0 otherwise5 
 
In the principal-agent model the relevant notion of incentive pay is a linear piece 
rate, or the slope of the relationship between the agent’s compensation and output, 
whereas our binary measure of performance pay describes whether performance-related 
pay is used at all, providing no information on its intensity.  From the standpoint of 
                                                 
5 The wording of the question permits group-based as well as individual-based schemes, whereas the 
relevant theories pertain to individual-based schemes.  This does not present a problem for our analysis.  
The majority of establishments reporting pay-for-performance use individual-based schemes in our data, 
and restricting the incentive pay measure to equal one only when it is certain that individual-based 
performance pay is used yields results very similar to those we report here. 
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testing Prendergast’s specific model, however, our binary measure actually matches the 
theory better than would a continuous measure of incentive pay within the establishment.  
The reason is that the prediction of Prendergast’s model (taken literally) is that the 
principal chooses either output-based pay or input-based pay and never a mix of the two, 
though the basic logic of Prendergast’s argument should extend to the proportion of 
compensation that is output-based.  Furthermore, since we have a large sample of 
establishments, with plenty of variation in the use of incentive pay, our binary measure 
provides valuable information, though more detailed data on a continuous measure of 
incentive pay within each establishment would be even more informative.   
 
Risk or Uncertainty 
In the principal-agent model, the agent’s output or net revenue (which equals the 
output or net revenue of the entire single-worker firm) is determined both by the agent’s 
effort level and by a stochastic component.  The variance of the stochastic component of 
output is referred to as risk or uncertainty.  Consider the piece-rate system used to 
compensate the installers of automobile windshields at Safelite Glass Corporation. 
Safelite designs a “one size fits all” piece-rate scheme that is applied uniformly to all 
workers in the job, in consideration of broad, market-level risks that are expected to 
influence the outputs of large groups of workers.  Our measure from the management 
survey is as follows:  
Risk = 1 if the current state of the market for the main product or service of the 
  establishment is described as “turbulent” 
        = 0 otherwise  
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    While the potential for such market-level turbulence to affect managerial output 
is clear, it is perhaps less obvious how the behavior of non-managerial workers might be 
affected.  At Safelite Glass Corporation, market turbulence can be expected to affect the 
productivity (output) of non-managerial workers even if they have some authority over 
the work process, as overall demand uncertainty for windshields trickles down to the 
typical windshield installer.  This captures Prendergast's notion of uncertainty in the 
production environment, but since it is a broad measure it is also likely to capture 
measurement noise. 
 
Worker Authority  
Prendergast (2002) draws a key “distinction between instances in which an 
employer tells his agent what to work on and situations in which the agent is given 
discretion over the activities that he spends time on. [emphasis added]” (p. 1072)  
Prendergast’s notion of authority therefore corresponds to delegating workers the power 
to make their own decisions about which tasks to perform.6  The WERS employee survey 
contains a question that closely corresponds to this notion.  At each establishment, up to 
25 employees are randomly sampled and asked the following question:    
“In general, how much influence do you have about the range of tasks you do in your 
job?”  Responses are recorded on a four-point scale (1 = “none”, 2 = “a little”, 3 = 
“some”, 4 = “a lot”).  We code all responses of “don’t know” as missing.  Since our 
measures of incentive pay, risk, and firm characteristics are measured at the 
establishment level, for the authority measure we aggregate the worker authority 
                                                 
6 Other studies that formalize the notion of the delegation of authority in the agency framework include 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Al-Najjar (2001). 
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responses to the establishment level by taking the modal worker response.7  The idea is 
that the most frequently occurring worker response to the authority questions within an 
establishment reflects the degree of authority experienced by the typical worker in that 
establishment.  In the main analysis we use the following four-valued authority measure 
and the four binary indicators implied by it: 
Authority = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “none” 
                = 2 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a little” 
                = 3 if establishment’s modal worker response is “some” 
                = 4 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a lot”   
Authority1 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “none” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
Authority2 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a little” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
Authority3 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “some” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
Authority4 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a lot” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
 
We also consider some alternative measures of authority in our sensitivity analysis. 
In addition to our key variables (i.e. risk, incentives, and authority), we include a 
large set of controls for firm characteristics in our models, including establishment size, 
main activity of the establishment, industry, whether the establishment is a single 
independent establishment or one of multiple establishments, ownership (private versus 
public, franchise versus non-franchise, publicly traded versus non-publicly traded), 
whether the establishment produces a single product or multiple products, fraction of 
part-time workers, presence of temporary workers, presence of fixed-term workers under 
one year, presence of fixed-term workers over one year, number of recognized unions, 
fraction of establishment that is unionized, and whether the establishment has been in 
                                                 
7 We also aggregated using the median rather than the mode throughout the paper, finding very similar 
results to those we report here.  These are available upon request.  The median results are virtually 
insensitive to how the median is defined when the number of workers sampled at the establishment is even 
(i.e. whether observation n/2 or observation n/2 + 1 is defined as the median). 
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operation for more than five years.  These controls are defined in the appendix.  Most are 
included simply to absorb employer attributes that may be correlated with the main 
variables of interest, though a few are included because of a clear theoretical rationale, in 
particular unionization and establishment size.  Given that unions exert considerable 
influence over both the level of compensation and its composition, the number of 
recognized unions at the establishment and also the fraction of the workforce that is 
unionized can be expected to influence the probability that an establishment will use 
incentive pay.  Regarding establishment size, monitoring difficulty increases as the 
number of employees gets larger, making the establishment more likely to grant 
employees pay for performance as a substitute for costly monitoring.  Coordinating and 
directing workers also becomes more costly as the number of employees increases, so 
larger organizations are more likely to resort to decentralization of decision-making and 
delegation.      
 
Empirical Analysis 
To investigate whether a tradeoff between risk and incentives, as predicted by 
standard agency theory, can be identified in the WERS data, we estimate the following 
probit model: 
Prob(Performance Payi = 1) = Φ(αRiski + Xiβ)   
where Xi is a vector of controls for firm characteristics, and i indexes establishments.  
Agency theory predicts α < 0.  Our results in Table 2 support this prediction, though they 
are estimated with modest precision.  In the first specification the effect is statistically 
insignificant.  As revealed in the second and third specifications, however, once industry 
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controls are included in the model the effect is statistically significant at the ten percent 
significance level on a one-tailed test. 8  Based on the third specification that includes the 
full set of controls, the change in the predicted probability that incentive pay is offered 
when Risk increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating other covariates at their means) is -0.051.  
This magnitude is substantial, given that the mean of Performance Pay is 0.196.  On 
average, an increase in Risk from 0 to 1 is associated with a decrease of 26 percent in the 
predicted probability that performance-related pay is used.  
We next investigate whether empirical support can be found for a positive 
relationship between authority and incentives.  The rationale for a positive correlation is 
that in risky settings the principal wants to switch from monitoring labor inputs to 
monitoring outputs.  In such settings, the firm delegates decision-making authority to the 
worker but accompanies this authority with output-based pay.  To test this empirically, 
we estimate the following probit model: 
Prob(Performance Payi = 1) = Φ(β2Authority2i + β3Authority3i + β4Authority4i + Xiβ).  
Empirical support for a positive correlation between authority and incentives would be 
implied by positive and statistically significant estimates of β2, β3, and β4; furthermore, 
there should be a monotonic pattern in the marginal effects, so that (relative to 
Authority1) the effect of Authority3 is higher than the effect of Authority2, and the effect 
of Authority4 is highest of all.  As seen in Table 3, in the first specification the relevant 
effects are statistically insignificant.  However, once industry controls are included in the 
model, the estimated effect of Authority4 is positive and significant at the five percent 
                                                 
8 Since the negative relationship between risk and incentives predicted by the principal-agent model is a 
directional hypothesis, we use one-tailed hypothesis tests as the criterion for statistical significance.  We 
adhere to this convention throughout the paper whenever a directional hypothesis is implied by the theory. 
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level on a one-tailed test, though the estimated effects of Authority2 and Authority3 
remain statistically insignificant.  Finally, our results support a monotonic pattern in the 
marginal effects, though only the effect of Authority4 is statistically significant.   
We next investigate whether empirical support can be found for a positive 
relationship between risk and delegation of authority.  A component of Prendergast’s 
model is that delegation of authority is more likely in risky settings, so that authority and 
risk are positively related.  To test this empirically, we estimate an ordered probit model 
in which the four-valued dependent variable is Authority, and Risk is the key independent 
variable.  The results, displayed in Table 4, clearly support a positive relationship 
between authority and risk.  In the most controlled specification, on average, the increase 
in the probability of the highest degree of authority being delegated that is associated 
with Risk is 11.9 percentage points, amounting to a 37.5% increase in the probability that 
the highest level of authority is delegated. 
 Finally, we address the central empirical question of this paper, namely whether 
there is empirical support for the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model.  
Prendergast argues that if controls for worker authority are added to risk-incentives 
regressions, the coefficient on risk should decrease.  That is, if the coefficient were 
positive without controls for authority, it should be less positive once authority is added 
as a control, and if the coefficient were negative in the absence of the authority control, it 
should be greater in magnitude once authority is added.  As a starting point we augment 
the model in Table 2 with controls for worker authority as follows: 
Prob(Performance Payi = 1) = Φ(αRiski + β2Authority2i + β3Authority3i + β4Authority4i + Xiβ)  
Prendergast’s argument suggests that the relatively weak statistical evidence of a risk-
incentives tradeoff that we found at the start of the section should strengthen when 
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authority controls are added to the model.  Table 5 displays the marginal effects.  The 
first six columns of the table should be read in pairs (i.e. columns 1 and 2 correspond to 
one specification, which is presented both with and without authority controls, columns 3 
and 4 correspond to another specification that includes industry controls, and columns 5 
and 6 correspond to a third specification that includes both industry and firm controls).  
When industry controls are included in the model, a statistically significant effect of Risk 
emerges.  In the third and most controlled specification, when authority is omitted from 
the model, Risk is associated with a 5.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
incentive pay being used, whereas when authority is included as a control, this magnitude 
increases to 6.8 percentage points, strengthening the evidence of a risk-incentives 
tradeoff as Prendergast’s model predicts.  A statistical test of the null hypothesis that the  
Risk coefficient is equal between the model that includes authority controls and the model 
that excludes authority controls (versus the alternative hypothesis that the Risk coefficient 
is lower in the model that includes authority controls than in the model that excludes 
authority controls) in the most controlled specification reveals that the null can be 
rejected at the ten percent significance level, and nearly at the five percent significance 
level (p-value = 0.052).  Furthermore, the marginal effect of Authority4 in that 
specification is positive and statistically significant, confirming the positive relationship 
between authority and incentive pay that we documented earlier in this section. 
 The results thus far appear supportive of the main testable implication of 
Prendergast’s model.  However, as mentioned in the introduction, worker authority is 
potentially endogenous in a risk-incentives regression.  Our results in the sixth column of 
Table 5 suggest that Authority4 is the authority variable that matters the most.  We thus 
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aggregate authority to two categories (i.e. we use only the dummy variable Authority4) 
and estimate a bivariate probit model of incentives and authority to account for this 
endogeneity, allowing for correlation between the unobserved determinants of both 
variables.  The bivariate probit model includes a dummy endogenous regressor (i.e. 
Authority4) in the incentives equation.  Note that in this model, except in rare cases that 
do not apply here, identification of the parameters is attained even in the absence of 
exclusion restrictions (Heckman 1978, Wilde 2000, Monfardini and Radice 2008).  The 
recursive structure of the model is consistent with Prendergast’s theory, e.g. “So 
uncertain environments result in the delegation of responsibilities, which in turn 
generates incentive pay based on output” (Prendergast, p. 1072).   
 Results from the bivariate probit are presented in the last two columns of Table 5.  
Marginal effects are displayed, along with the point estimates (in square brackets) and 
their standard errors (in parentheses below the point estimates).  The essential point to 
note from the bivariate probit results is that an exogeneity test reveals that the null 
hypothesis that worker authority is exogeneous cannot be rejected.  That is, the null 
hypothesis that ρ = 0 cannot be rejected, where ρ is the correlation in the disturbances in 
the incentives and authority equations.  This means that in the empirical tests it is 
reasonable to use a comparison of columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 that treated authority as 
exogenous in evaluating the main testable prediction of Prendergast’s model.  Our 
conclusion is that when authority controls are added to the risk-incentives model, the 
evidence of a risk-incentives tradeoff strengthens, supporting Prendergast’s main testable 
implication. 
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Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Authority and Incentive Pay 
Although the measure of worker authority we use throughout the analysis closely 
matches the notion described in Prendergast (2002), we also consider some alternative 
authority measures.  These are measures of worker discretion over how tasks are 
executed (as opposed to the range of tasks performed).  The questions are asked both of 
the employer and of the workers, allowing us to construct the following employer-
perceived and worker-perceived measures of authority over how tasks are executed: 
   
Worker-Perceived Worker Authority Measures 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)1 = 1 if  the establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
       worker discretion over how tasks are executed is “none” or “a   
       little” 
                                     = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)2 = 1 if the establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
           worker discretion over how tasks are executed is “some” 
                                     = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)3 = 1 if the establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
       worker discretion over how tasks are executed is “a lot” 
                = 0 otherwise 
Firm-Perceived Worker Authority Measures 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)1 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
      executed is “none” 
              = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)2 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
      executed is “a little” 
              = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)3 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
          executed is “some” 
                = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)4 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
      executed is “a lot” 
              = 0 otherwise 
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The variable names include “(W)” or “(F)” to indicate which worker authority measures 
reflect worker perceptions and which reflect firm perceptions.  The lowest two categories 
of the worker-perceived measure are aggregated from four categories to three due to an 
extremely small count in the lowest cell.  One difference between the worker-perceived 
measures and the firm-perceived measures is that the question in the employer survey 
pertains to the discretion of workers in the establishment’s largest occupational group, 
whereas the question from the worker survey is based on a random sample of workers in 
the establishment.  That is, in the employer survey the respondent employer is asked to 
rate the level of worker authority in the establishment’s “largest occupational group” 
rather than in the establishment as a whole. 
 We estimate models that include different combinations of authority controls 
(authority over range of tasks performed, worker-perceived authority over how tasks are 
executed, employer-perceived authority over how tasks are executed).  Results are 
displayed in Table 6.  When reading Table 6, compare the marginal effect of Risk in the 
first column to the marginal effect of Risk in each of the remaining columns, to see how 
the risk-incentives relationship changes when different configurations of authority 
controls are added to the model.  The results reveal that the authority measure that 
individually suggests the strongest empirical support for Prendergast’s theory is also the 
measure that best matches the notion of authority discussed in his paper (namely 
authority over the range of tasks performed), since the risk effect decreases by the most 
when these particular authority measures are included as controls.  
Statistical tests of the null hypothesis that the Risk coefficient is equal between the 
model that includes authority controls (i.e. column 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) and the model that 
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excludes authority controls (i.e. column 1), versus the alternative hypothesis that the Risk 
coefficient is lower in the model that includes authority controls than in the model that 
excludes authority controls, reveals that the null is virtually always rejected when the 
main measures of authority are used but not when the alternative measures are used.  
More precisely, the null can be rejected at the ten percent significance level in columns 1 
versus 2 (p-value = 0.057) and in columns 1 versus 6 (p-value = 0.088), and it narrowly 
misses rejection at the ten percent significance level in columns 1 versus 4 (p-value = 
0.107).  When only the alternative measures are used, the null is not at all close to 
rejection; the p-value is 0.440 for columns 1 versus 3, and the p-value is 0.283 for 
columns 1 versus 5.  Thus, statistical evidence supporting Prendergast’s main prediction 
emerges only for the main authority measure and not for the alternative authority 
measures.    
Turning now to alternative measures of incentive pay, a potential drawback of our 
measure is that it refers to group performance-related schemes as well as individual 
performance-related schemes, whereas the theory we address in this paper pertains to 
individual performance-related schemes.  To explore this issue, we use some further 
information in the WERS employer survey.  If the respondent reports that performance-
related pay is used at the establishment and that “any non-managerial occupations [are] 
eligible”, the respondent is then asked what measures of performance are used to 
determine the amount of performance-related pay.  Respondents can list as many of the 
following responses as they wish, in addition to providing their own responses not on the 
list: “1 = Individual performance / output”, “2 = Group or team performance / output”, “3 
= Workplace-based measures”, “4 = Organisation-based measures”.  The most common 
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response is “1”, either alone or in combination with other choices.  Using this information 
we modify the binary performance measure we have used throughout the analysis.  If an 
establishment reports the use of performance-related pay but does not include “1 = 
Individual performance / output” in its list of responses to the above question, we 
reclassify the binary performance pay measure for this observation from 1 to 0.  The idea 
behind this reclassification is to create a binary incentive pay measure that equals one 
only if it can be determined with certainty (abstracting from reporting and coding errors) 
that performance-related pay is used and at least some of it is based on individual 
performance or output. 
Two points are worth noting about this modified measure.  First, when the 
respondent lists more than one answer to the question of what type of performance-
related scheme is used at the establishment, there is no way to discern the relative 
importance of the responses listed.  Second, because the question is only asked if 
performance-pay is used and “any non-managerial occupations [are] eligible”, if 
performance pay is used at the establishment but no non-managerial occupations are 
eligible for it we have no information on what type of performance pay is used.  Thus, we 
only have information on the type of performance-related pay used for 357 of the 418 
establishments that report the use of performance-related pay.  For the remaining 61 
establishments we define the binary incentive measure as “1” even though in some of 
these cases the performance-pay might not be based on individual performance / output.  
The mean of the modified incentive pay measure is 0.151, as opposed to 0.196 for the 
unmodified measure we use throughout the paper.  Replicating all of our analysis in the 
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paper using the modified measure yields no qualitative changes to our conclusions.  All 
of these results are available upon request.   
 
V. DISCUSSION 
In this study we use a large, nationally representative cross section of British 
establishments, containing responses both from employers and from multiple workers in 
each establishment, to shed light on the four empirical questions posed in the 
introduction.  In answer to the first question, we find statistically weak evidence of the 
negative relationship between risk and incentives predicted by the standard principal-
agent model.  On average, greater turbulence in the market for the establishment’s main 
product or service is associated with a lower probability of performance-related pay for 
the establishment as a whole.  In answer to the second and third questions, we find 
evidence supporting a positive relationship between performance-related pay and the 
degree of worker authority over the range of tasks performed, and evidence supporting a 
positive relationship between risk and the degree of worker authority.   
In answer to the fourth question, our results suggest that when measures of worker 
authority are included in a risk-incentives model, the relationship between risk and 
incentives becomes more negative, and the potential endogeneity of authority in this 
model does not appear to be a concern.  We interpret the overall evidence in this 
empirical test of Prendergast’s theory as supportive.  The evidence from the WERS data 
suggests that Prendergast’s theory is at least part of the reason why a vast empirical 
literature has failed to uncover the negative relationship between risk and incentives that 
has been central to agency theory for nearly three decades.   
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We conclude with four comments.  First, while some of our main results are 
estimated with high precision, others are not.  Throughout the analysis, we rely on one-
tailed hypothesis tests since the relevant theory implies directional hypotheses.  However, 
in some cases our results would not achieve statistical significance at conventional levels 
if the more stringent two-tailed tests were used instead. 
 Second, while our results on the risk-incentives tradeoff represent only one study 
in a vast empirical literature that has found mixed evidence, we believe the breadth of our 
sample (which is nationally representative of all British establishments) makes our results 
particularly interesting.  While many analyses of the risk-incentives tradeoff have been 
conducted, the heavy focus has been on a relatively small set of worker groups, in 
particular groups that, it is fair to say, are atypical.  For example, while the number of 
jobs held by either CEOs or sharecroppers is negligible, the majority of previous 
empirical studies focus on these two groups.  The general point is that it is difficult to 
know what relative weights to assign to the various empirical studies in forming an 
overall evaluation.  We think the present study, based on a broad and nationally 
representative sample of establishments, contributes to forming such an overall 
evaluation.   
Third, we hope that our results will stimulate further research in this area using 
other data sets.  Panel data would be particularly helpful to convincingly identify causal 
parameters; the cross sectional nature of our data is a limitation of our analysis.  Also, 
since we have focused only on Britain, due to the strengths of the WERS data for testing 
Prendergast’s theory, it would be useful for future tests to use data from the United States 
and other countries.  While we cannot rule out the possibility that the empirical support of 
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Prendergast’s model is specific to Britain, we will be rather surprised if this is confirmed 
in future work.  We see nothing peculiar to Britain in the fundamental workplace issues 
Prendergast’s model addresses, and we therefore expect the empirical support for his 
model in Britain to generalize to data sets from other countries.  Furthermore, though our 
binary measure of incentive pay proved to be quite informative, more detailed 
information concerning how the intensity of incentive pay varies across organizations 
would also be interesting.   
 Finally, while we believe our results suggest that Prendergast’s theory at least 
partially explains why the empirical literature has failed to uncover a risk-incentives 
tradeoff, this does not rule out that alternative theories may also play a role.  Our focus on 
Prendergast’s theory in this analysis is driven largely by the availability of an authority 
measure that corresponds closely to the notion discussed by Prendergast.  Though we 
believe our evidence is supportive of Prendergast’s theory, we do not see it as casting 
doubt on the alternative models, and we see investigation of these alternatives as a 
promising direction for future work with other data sets.   
 
APPENDIX 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS USED AS CONTROL VARIABLES: 
Single-Establishment Firm = 1 if the establishment is either a single independent 
establishment not belonging to another body, or the sole 
UK establishment of a foreign organization 
= 0 if the establishment is one of a number of different 
establishments within a larger organization       
 
Establishment Size = total number of full time, part time, and temporary workers at the 
establishment (measured in thousands) 
 
Fraction of Part Time Workers = number of part time workers at the establishment as a 
fraction of establishment size 
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Temporary Workers = 1 if there are temporary agency employees working at the 
establishment at the time of the survey 
= 0 otherwise 
 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year = 1 if there are employees who are working on a 
temporary basis or have fixed-term contracts 
for less than one year 
= 0 otherwise 
 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year = 1 if there are employees who have fixed term 
contracts for one year or more 
  = 0 otherwise 
 
Number of Recognized Unions = total number of recognized unions at the workplace 
 
100% Workers Unionized = 1 if 100% of all employees, including managers, are covered 
by collective bargaining either at this workplace or at a 
higher level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise  
 
80-99% Workers Unionized = 1 if 80-99% of all employees, including managers, are 
covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise 
 
60-79% Workers Unionized = 1 if 60-79% of all employees, including managers, are 
covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise 
 
40-59% Workers Unionized = 1 if 40-59% of all employees, including managers, are 
covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise 
 
20-39% Workers Unionized = 1 if 20-39% of all employees, including managers, are 
covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise 
 
1-19% Workers Unionized = 1 if 1-19% of all employees, including managers, are 
covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise 
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0% Workers Unionized = 1 if 0% of all employees, including managers, are covered by 
collective bargaining either at this workplace or at a higher 
level (employee-perceived measure) 
= 0 otherwise 
 
Main Activity of Establishment = 1 if the main activity of the establishment is to produce 
goods or services for consumers  
= 0 for any of the following other possibilities: supplier 
of goods or services to other companies; supplier of 
goods or services to other parts of the organization to 
which we belong; do not produce goods or provide 
services for sale in the open market; an administrative 
office only 
 
 
Single Product = 1 if the establishment is concentrated on one product or service 
 = 0 if it is concentrated on several different products or services 
 
Private Sector Franchise = 1 if the establishment is a private sector company and a 
franchise  
= 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Non-franchise = 1 if the establishment is a private sector company but not 
a franchise 
= 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise = 1 if the establishment is a publicly-traded 
private sector unit and a franchise  
= 0 otherwise  
 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise = 1 if the establishment is a publicly-
traded private sector unit but not a 
franchise   
= 0 otherwise  
 
Operation Over Five Years = 1 if the workplace has been operating at its present address 
for 5 years or more 
= 0 otherwise 
 
Industry Controls:  (Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas, and Water; Construction; Wholesale 
and Retail; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport and Communication; Financial 
Services; Other Business Services; Public Administration; Education; Health; 
Other Community Services) 
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 Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Min Max Median Std. Dev. 
Basic Firm Characteristics:      
Risk 0.218 0 1 0 0.388 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.350 0 1 0 0.435 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.140 0 1 0 0.401 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.233 0 1 0 0.493 
Operation Over Five Years 0.899 0 1 1 0.297 
Main Activity of Establishment 0.686 0 1 1 0.457 
Temporary Workers 0.193 0 1 0 0.483 
Establishment Size 0.062 0.002 28.971 0.106 0.928 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.310 0 1 0.132 0.287 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.637 0 10 1 1.893 
100% Workers Unionized 0.236 0 1 0 0.444 
80-99% Workers Unionized 0.045 0 1 0 0.323 
60-79% Workers Unionized 0.035 0 1 0 0.251 
40-59% Workers Unionized 0.018 0 1 0 0.178 
20-39% Workers Unionized 0.007 0 1 0 0.097 
1-19% Workers Unionized 0.016 0 1 0 0.132 
0% Workers Unionized 0.644 0 1 0 0.500 
Firm Ownership:      
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise 0.016 0 1 0 0.122 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise 0.329 0 1 0 0.495 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.027 0 1 0 0.109 
Private Sector Franchise 0.469 0 1 0 0.473 
Industry:      
Manufacturing 0.166 0 1 0 0.376 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.002 0 1 0 0.176 
Construction 0.041 0 1 0 0.209 
Wholesale and Retail 0.235 0 1 0 0.382 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.088 0 1 0 0.256 
Transport and Communication 0.048 0 1 0 0.246 
Financial Services 0.039 0 1 0 0.232 
Other Business Services 0.115 0 1 0 0.315 
Public Administration 0.020 0 1 0 0.176 
Education 0.098 0 1 0 0.293 
Health 0.110 0 1 0 0.297 
Other Community Services 0.038 0 1 0 0.209 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace:      
Managers and Administrators 0.006 0 1 0 0.075 
Professional Occupations 0.099 0 1 0 0.326 
Associate Professional and Technical Operations 0.056 0 1 0 0.267 
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations 0.145 0 1 0 0.349 
Craft and Skilled Service Occupations 0.132 0 1 0 0.324 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations 0.170 0 1 0 0.333 
Sales Occupations 0.162 0 1 0 0.343 
Plant and Machine Operatives 0.138 0 1 0 0.365 
Other Occupations 0.092 0 1 0 0.319 
Incentive Pay:      
Performance Pay 0.196 0 1 0 0.440 
Worker Authority:      
Authority1 0.078 0 1 0 0.277 
Authority2 0.078 0 1 0 0.244 
Authority3 0.526 0 1 1 0.495 
Authority4 0.317 0 1 0 0.451 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)1 0.032 0 1 0 0.141 
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AUTHORITYHOW(W)2 0.307 0 1 0 0.443 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)3 0.660 0 1 1 0.453 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)1 0.072 0 1 0 0.276 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)2 0.209 0 1 0 0.445 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)3 0.441 0 1 0 0.496 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)4 0.278 0 1 0 0.410 
Sample Size = 1590      
Note:  Tabulations are for the 1590 establishments in the private sector for which data on both risk and incentives are non-missing and 
excluding those establishments in public administration.  Some of the above statistics are based on a smaller sample, however, due to 
missing values.  Establishment Size is measured in thousands. 
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Table 2:  Evidence of a Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives 
 Dependent Variable: Performance Pay
Independent Variables:    
Risk -0.039  
(0.046) 
-0.061* 
(0.039) 
-0.051* 
(0.036) 
Industry Controls:    
Manufacturing  -0.123*** 
(0.027) 
-0.108*** 
(0.026) 
Electricity, Gas, and Water  -0.060 
(0.045) 
-0.100*** 
(0.018) 
Construction  -0.120*** 
(0.027) 
-0.107*** 
(0.023) 
Hotels and Restaurants  -0.128*** 
(0.026) 
-0.108*** 
(0.022) 
Transport and Communication  -0.078* 
(0.042) 
-0.083*** 
(0.027) 
Financial Services  0.115 
(0.087) 
0.064 
(0.083) 
Other Business Services  -0.095*** 
(0.031) 
-0.078*** 
(0.028) 
Public Administration  -0.109*** 
(0.033) 
-0.111*** 
(0.022) 
Education  -0.171*** 
(0.023) 
-0.156*** 
(0.026) 
Health  -0.194*** 
(0.023) 
-0.167*** 
(0.021) 
Other Community Services  -0.121*** 
(0.024) 
-0.101*** 
(0.021) 
Firm Controls:    
Single-Establishment Firm   0.003 
(0.033) 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year   -0.011 
(0.048) 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year   0.041 
(0.029) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise   0.058 
(0.123) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise   -0.017 
(0.068) 
Private Sector Non-franchise   0.089 
(0.173) 
Private Sector Franchise   -0.093 
(0.070) 
Operation Over Five Years   0.040 
(0.032) 
Main Activity of Establishment   0.083** 
(0.032) 
Temporary Workers   0.017 
(0.029) 
Establishment Size   0.036 
(0.024) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers   -0.130** 
(0.056) 
Number of Recognized Unions   0.017 
(0.013) 
100% Workers Unionized   -0.070 
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(0.047) 
80-99% Workers Unionized   -0.045 
(0.041) 
60-79% Workers Unionized   -0.005 
(0.045) 
40-59% Workers Unionized   -0.106 
(0.068) 
20-39% Workers Unionized   0.035 
(0.102) 
1-19% Workers Unionized   -0.169 
(0.106) 
Sample Size 1546 1546 1546 
Note:  Results are probit marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent variables, the change in 
predicted probabilities when the independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means).  Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test for Risk and two-tailed 
tests for all other covariates.  Reference group for industry dummies is Wholesale and Retail.  Reference group for % unionized dummies is 0% 
Workers Unionized. 
 
 
Table 3:  Relationship Between Incentive Pay and Worker Authority 
 Dependent Variable: Performance Pay 
Independent Variables:  
Authority2 0.028 
(0.110) 
-0.037 
(0.083) 
-0.025 
(0.069) 
Authority3 -0.012 
(0.087) 
0.014 
(0.064) 
0.000 
(0.052) 
Authority4 0.069 
(0.090) 
0.110** 
(0.066) 
0.100** 
(0.057) 
    
Industry Controls NO YES 
 
YES 
 
Firm Controls NO NO YES 
Sample Size 1245 1245 1245 
Note:  Results are probit marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent variables, the change in predicted 
probabilities when the independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means).  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test for Authority2, Authority3, Authority4.  See 
Appendix for definitions of industry and firm controls. 
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Table 4:  Relationship Between Worker Authority and Risk 
 Dependent Variable: Authority 
Independent Variables:    
Risk 0.084*  
(0.055) 
0.094**  
(0.052) 
0.119**  
(0.053) 
Industry Controls NO YES YES 
Firm Controls NO NO YES 
Sample Size 1245 1245 1245 
Note:  Results are probit marginal effects for Prob(Authority = 4) evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent 
variables, the change in the predicted Prob(Authority = 4) when the independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their 
means).  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a 
one-tailed test for Risk.  See Appendix for definitions of industry and firm controls. 
 
 
TABLE 5: Testing the Main Prediction of Prendergast (2002) 
 Probit Bivariate Probit 
   
 Dependent Variable:   
Performance Pay 
Dependent Variable:  
Performance Pay  
Dependent 
Variable:  
Authority4 
   
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Risk -0.051  
(0.052) 
-0.057  
(0.052) 
-0.065*  
(0.043) 
-0.074* 
(0.041) 
-0.057* 
(0.040) 
-0.068** 
(0.039) 
       -0.075 [-0.412]** 
              (0.235) 
0.139 [0.405]** 
       (0.174) 
Authority2  0.025 
(0.110) 
 -0.043 
(0.084) 
 -0.032 
(0.070) 
   
Authority3  -0.013 
(0.088) 
 0.010 
(0.067) 
 -0.001 
(0.055) 
   
Authority4  0.071 
(0.092) 
 0.113* 
(0.069) 
 0.104** 
(0.060) 
 0.172 [0.947] 
           (0.757) 
 
Industry Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Firm Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES  YES YES 
Ρ        -0.209 
(0.437)
Sample Size 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245  1245 1245 
Note:  Results in the first 6 columns are probit marginal effects for Prob(Performance Pay = 1) evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent variables, the change in the predicted 
Prob(Performance Pay = 1) when the independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means), with robust standard errors in parentheses.  For the bivariate probit results in the last 2 
columns, marginal effects are displayed to the left of the parameter estimates and their robust standard errors (in square brackets and parentheses, respectively); ρ denotes the correlation between the disturbances in the 
two equations.  In the entire table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test for Risk, Authority2, Authority3, and Authority4.  See Appendix for 
definitions of industry and firm controls. 
 
 
Table 6:  Test of Prendergast’s Main Prediction with Alternative Measures of 
Worker Authority 
 Dependent Variable:  Performance Pay 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk -0.057* 
(0.040) 
-0.067** 
(0.039) 
-0.057* 
(0.040) 
       -0.065** 
(0.039) 
     -0.059* 
 (0.039) 
     -0.067** 
(0.038) 
Authority2  -0.032 (0.070)  
-0.029 
(0.067)  
     -0.023 
(0.066) 
Authority3  -0.001 (0.055)  
 0.000 
(0.054)  
      0.007 
      (0.055) 
Authority4  0.105** (0.060)  
0.113** 
(0.059)  
0.119** 
(0.059) 
AuthorityHOW(W)2   0.007 (0.101) 
0.014 
(0.103)  
 0.003 
(0.103) 
AuthorityHOW(W)3   0.018        (0.098) 
-0.009 
(0.100)  
-0.025 
 (0.100) 
AuthorityHOW(F)2          0.087** (0.050) 
0.089** 
   (0.047) 
AuthorityHOW(F)3     0.038 (0.048) 
0.042 
   (0.047) 
AuthorityHOW(F)4          0.071*      (0.050) 
0.055 
        (0.047) 
Firm and industry 
controls YES YES YES YES       YES YES 
Sample Size 1241 1241 1241 1241 1241 1241 
Note:  Results are probit marginal effects for Prob(Performance Pay = 1) evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent 
variables, the change in the predicted Prob(Performance Pay = 1) when the independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at 
their means).  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 
one-tailed tests.  Firm and industry controls are those listed in Table 2; see the Appendix for their definitions.    
  
 
 
 
